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The Inadequacy of the Damages Assessed Upon Violation of the Breach 
Notification Rule  
JEFFREY GASKILL  
INTRODUCTION  
As the world becomes increasingly digitalized, the importance of the security and privacy 
of client information rises as well.  Congress has acknowledged this issue with the passage and 
proposals of various bills such as: The Privacy Act of 1974, the Gramm-Leach-Biley Act, the 
Personal Data Privacy and Security Act of 2011, the Personal Data Protection and Breach 
Accountability Act of 2011, and the SAFE Data Act.
1
  “Information security laws are designed 
to protect personally identifiable information from compromise, unauthorized disclosure, 
unauthorized acquisition, unauthorized access, or other situations where unauthorized persons 
have access or potential access to such information for unauthorized purposes.”2  However, 
despite statutory provisions and penalties designed to protect the public against the disclosure of 
personal health information, there have been about 55,500 instances of unsecured health 
information breach since 2009, with nearly 500 hundred of which having affected 500 or more 
individuals.
3
  
This paper examines the Breach Notification Rule under the Health Information 
Technology for Economic and Clinical Health Act (HITECH Act).  Part I introduces a few cases 
of recent health data breaches that illustrate a need for stronger statutory provisions.  Part II 
briefly discusses the legislative history of the Breach Notification Rule and looks to the pertinent 
statutory text.  Part III looks at common causes of data breach and associated costs related to data 
                                                            
1 GINA STEVENS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42475, DATA SECURITY BREACH NOTIFICATION LAWS 2 (2012).  
2 GINA STEVENS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL34120, FEDERAL INFORMATION SECURITY AND DATA BREACH 
NOTIFICATION LAWS 2 (2010).  
3 Lucas Mearian, ‘Wall of Shame’ exposes 21M medical record breaches, COMPUTERWORLD (Aug. 7, 2012, 6:00 
AM), 
http://www.computerworld.com/s/article/9230028/_Wall_of_Shame_exposes_21M_medical_record_breaches. 
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breaches.  Part IV details what covered entities should be doing to ensure that they are compliant 
with pre-breach best practices and how to properly handle breaches once they occur.  Part V 
outlines the current causes of actions that can be brought by either the Secretary of the 
Department of Health and Human Services or state attorney generals.  Part VI examines some of 
the current, pending class action lawsuits that have been filed under state law privacy statutes 
and how a private cause of action would benefit the Breach Notification Rule.  Finally, Part VII 
introduces suggested statutory amendments, partially drawn from state law and other areas of 
health, which should help to reduce the number of and severity of future health data breaches. 
I. THE NEED FOR STATUTORY REVISIONS TO THE BREACH NOTIFICATION RULE 
 Congress has taken admirable steps in attempting to ensure the privacy of patient health 
records through the passage of the Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical 
Health Act (HITECH); a section of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act which 
amended and added to the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) of 
1996.  Unfortunately, the Breach Notification Rule of the HITECH Act has been difficult for the 
Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) to finalize, partly because of the every-
changing dynamic of the health information technology field and a large response to a call for 
public comment on the interim Breach Notification Rule.
4
  Acknowledging the complexity of the 
issues at hand, HHS has withdrawn a developed final rule from the Office of Management and 
                                                            
4 Breach Notification Final Rule Update, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES, 
http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/privacy/hipaa/administrative/breachnotificationrule/finalruleupdate.html (last visited Dec. 6, 
2012).  A contributing factor was the passage of the Affordable Care Act which has increased the speed in which 
health records are being converted to electronic medium. See also Your Health and Your Privacy: Protecting Heath 
Information in a Digital World: Hearing Before the Subcomm. On Privacy, Technology, and the Law, 112th Cong. 
(2011), available at 
http://www.judiciary.senate.gov/hearings/hearing.cfm?id=9b6937d5e931a0b792d258d9b332c04d. 
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Budget “to allow for further consideration.”5  Given the number of breaches that have invoked 
the notification requirement and the subjectively lenient treatment thereof, the interim breach 
notification rule is insufficient as a means of deterrence against the wrongful disclosure of 
unsecure health information and the protection of patient privacy.
6
  
 The disclosure of patient-identifiable health records is an issue worthy of significant 
protection because patients maintain a fundamental right to privacy
7
 (encompassing things like 
medical diagnoses, use of prescription medication, etc.) and more importantly, from a fiscal-
sense, disclosure may place patients in danger of identity theft.
8
  It is for these reasons that 
particular instances of health data breach are so frightening and why the Breach Notification 
Rule and resulting penalties must be tailored as a proper deterrence.  The following two 
examples illustrate how breaches can transpire and will be useful in reading the rest of this paper.  
A. The University of Miami Hospital Breach  
In July 2012, law enforcement officers discovered that two University of Miami Hospital 
employees had been stealing patient “face sheets,” containing “names, addresses, dates of birth, 
insurance policy numbers and reasons for the visit.”9  There is a possibility that the employees 
had sold the data to a third party and were immediately discharged from employment.
10
  The 
                                                            
5 Breach Notification Final Rule Update, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES, 
http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/privacy/hipaa/administrative/breachnotificationrule/finalruleupdate.html (last visited Dec. 6, 
2012).   
6 Breach Affecting 500 or More Individuals, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES: HEALTH 
INFORMATION PRIVACY, 
http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/privacy/hipaa/administrative/breachnotificationrule/breachtool.html (last visited Dec. 6, 
2012). 
7 See generally Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 Harv. L. Rev. 193 (1890) 
(distinguishing a right to privacy under theories of life, liberty and property). 
8 See generally About Identity Theft, FIGHTING BACK AGAINST IDENTITY THEFT, 
http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/edu/microsites/idtheft/consumers/about-identity-theft.html (last visited Dec. 6, 2012) 
(discussing the nature of identity theft, how it is committed, and how the information can be used). 
9 Alicia Caramenico, U of Miami Hospital suffers patient data breach, FIERCE HEALTHCARE (Sept. 12, 2012), 
http://www.fiercehealthcare.com/story/u-miami-hospital-suffers-patient-data-breach/2012-09-12. 
10 Dan Snyder, University of Miami Hospital Data Incident: July 2012: Frequently Asked Questions, UNIVERSITY OF 
MIAMI HOSPITAL, http://www.umhdataincident.med.miami.edu/ (last visited Dec. 6, 2012);  Using patient 
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malfeasance allegedly occurred over a 22-month period beginning in October 2010 and affected 
thousands of patients, though an exact total is unknown.
11
  While the “face sheets” did not 
contain financial information, Social Security Numbers were used as the insurance policy 
number for Medicare and Medicaid patients.
12
 
Law enforcement delayed notification to the public in order to conduct a criminal 
investigation, as permitted by the Breach Notification Rule.
13
  In compliance with the statute, the 
hospital sent a letter to affected individuals in September 2012 detailing the breach.
14
  In 
addition, the hospital stated that it would review its practices to protect against future incidents 
and also offered two years of credit monitoring to affected individuals.
15
 
The University of Miami Hospital breach is illustrative of several aspects of the Breach 
Notification Rule, many of which are discussed in detail infra.  First, the hospital’s lack of 
sufficient records kept them from gauging the scope of the breach.  This surely increased the cost 
of providing credit monitoring since there were few parameters as to who it was offered to.  
Second, the involvement of law enforcement officials will likely result in criminal charges 
against the employees, but the fact that law enforcement discovered the breach could be 
indicative of the hospital having not complied with various security regulations.  Finally, given 
that the actions of the hospital employees went undiscovered for so long, it is even more 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
information with the intent to sell is punishable with a fine of not more than $250,000 and/or imprisonment of not 
more than 10 years. 42 USCA § 1320d-6(b)(3) (West). 
11 John Dorschner, Two University of Miami Hospital employees may have stolen, sold patient data, THE MIAMI 
HERALD (Sept. 7, 2012), http://www.miamiherald.com/2012/09/07/2990379/two-university-of-miami-hospital.html. 
12 Erin McCann, Miami hospital data breach due to employee offense, HEALTHCARE IT NEWS (Sept. 11, 2012), 
http://www.healthcareitnews.com/news/u-miami-data-breach-due-employee-offense. 
13 Dan Snyder, University of Miami Hospital Data Incident: July 2012: Frequently Asked Questions, UNIVERSITY OF 
MIAMI HOSPITAL, http://www.umhdataincident.med.miami.edu/ (last visited Dec. 6, 2012); 42 USCA § 17932(g) 
(West).  
14 Dan Snyder, University of Miami Hospital Data Incident: July 2012: Letter, UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI HOSPITAL, 
http://www.umhdataincident.med.miami.edu/letter.html (last visited Dec. 6, 2012). 
15 Id. Claiming to review practices may be solely procedural since the hospital had suffered a breach less than a year 
prior to this affecting 1,219 patients. Erin McCann, Miami hospital data breach due to employee offense, 
HEALTHCARE IT NEWS (Sept. 11, 2012), http://www.healthcareitnews.com/news/u-miami-data-breach-due-
employee-offense. 
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disconcerting that breaches can come from outside the organization and remain unknown until 
there is harm.  In August 2012, it was disclosed to the media that hackers had encrypted a server 
of The Surgeons of Lake County which stored electronic medical records.
16
  They demanded 
payment in return for the password, oblivious to the fact that the doctors were capable of turning 
off the server and rendering it inaccessible to either party.
17
  Both cases demonstrate the 
increasing dangers to the privacy and security of patients as more health records are converted to 
electronic records.  
B. The Accretive Health Breach 
 In 2011, two laptops were stolen from employees of Accretive Health Inc. in Minnesota, 
resulting in the disclosure of over 23,000 personal health records.
18
  The data contained on the 
laptops was unencrypted and disclosed information such as the patient’s name, address, phone 
number, date of birth, Social Security Number, and diagnostic information.
19
  Accretive Health 
did utilize an encryption system, but the system was not up to date on 30 of the 1,400 laptops in 
use and these two particular laptops, while being password protected, were not encryption 
compliant.
20
  What distinguishes this case from the Miami University case is that Accretive is not 
a HIPAA covered-entity; it was a business associate of two Minnesota hospitals: Fairview Health 
Services and North Memorial Health Care.
21
 
                                                            
16 Jordan Robertson, Hackers Encrypt Health Records and Hold Data for Ransom, BLOOMBERG (Aug. 10, 2012, 
1:00 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-08-10/hackers-encrypt-health-records-and-hold-data-for-
ransom.html. 
17 Id. 
18 Response to Inquiry by Senator Al Franken, ACCRETIVE HEALTH (May 11, 2012), 
http://docs.ismgcorp.com/files/external/2012_05_11_Franken_Response.pdf [hereinafter Franken Response]. See 
also Second Amended and Supplemental Complaint at 20-26, State v. Accretive Health, Inc., No. 12-145 RHK/JJK 
(D. Minn. 2012), 2012 WL 2891151 [hereinafter Accretive Complaint]. 
19 Franken Response supra note 18.  
20 Id. 
21 Accretive Complaint supra note 18 at 1, 13.  
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 Accretive Health manages the “Revenue Cycle Operations” of client hospitals.22  Their 
functions include “scheduling, eligibility verification, registration, admissions, coding and 
clinical documentation, dealing with third party payors, billing, and collection and payment 
functions.”23  The HITECH amendments to HIPAA included business associates under the 
Breach Notification Rule and, as such, they must meet many of the same standards as covered 
entities.
24
  Accretive failed to live up to many of these standards and were alleged to have failed 
to limit access to patient data only to those employees that needed access, failed to use a limited 
data set, failed to meet minimum encryption requirements, and failed to sufficiently train 
employees.
25
  Under the statutory cause of action, Minnesota State Attorney General, Lori 
Swanson, brought a civil action on behalf of the affected clients.
26
  
 The parties settled, agreeing to monetary damages of $2,490,400 to be paid to the 
patients, the administration of the settlement, and remaining funds to the Treasury of the State.
27
  
This amounted to $100 per affected patient, the maximum amount permitted, but exceeded the 
statutory limitation of $25,000 in a single calendar year.
28
  The settlement also enjoined 
Accretive from operating within the state for a period of six years, a remedy that is 
unprecedented in HITECH Breach Notification Rule case law.
29
  While this may seem like a 
substantial penalty, Accretive shareholders anticipated much worse and the stock price rose 37% 
                                                            
22 Accretive Complaint supra note 18 at 24.  
23 Accretive Complaint supra note 18 at 24. 
24 42 U.S.C.A. § 17932. 
25 Accretive Complaint supra note 18 at 47, 49, 58.  
26 42 U.S.C.A. § 1320d-5(d); See generally Accretive Complaint supra note 18. The action included count against 
Accretive for the use of unlawful collections practices.  
27 Settlement Agreement, Release and Order at 17, State v. Accretive Health, Inc., No. 12-145 RHK/JJK (D. Minn. 
2012) , 2012 WL 3065397 [hereinafter Accretive Settlement].  
28 42 U.S.C.A. § 1320d-5(d)(2).  
29 Accretive Settlement supra note 27 at 13-16.  
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the day the settlement was announced.
30
  The fine is relatively insubstantial given Accretive is 
valued at around $1.2 billion and had a net income of over $29 million in 2011.
31
   
The Accretive case is best illustrative of the insufficient penalties to breaching parties.  
The Department of Health and Human Services may first bring an action under the Breach 
Notification Rule, but the monetary penalties are not to exceed $1.5 million during a calendar 
year.
32
  Had the Accretive case been brought to trial and ruled for the State, monetary damages 
for the breach would have been limited to $25,000, so the settlement penalty was focused more 
on improper collections practices rather than the breach of patient data.
33
  With such inadequate 
penalties and the inexistence of a finalized rule, HHS cannot expect covered entities and business 
associates to invest in the required safeguards that would protect personal health records from 
breach. 
II. THE STATUTORY TEXT OF THE BREACH NOTIFICATION RULE UNDER HITECH 
 While this paper also examines safeguards to data breach and proposed amendments to 
the damages applicable under HIPAA, it is necessary to detail the statutory text of the Breach 
Notification Rule as guidance for the covered entities and business associates governed by the 
rule.  Covered entities include health plans, health care clearinghouses, and health care providers 
who transmit any health information in electronic form.
34
  The term business associate 
encompasses those whom perform or assist in the performance of a function or activity involving 
the use or disclosure of individually identifiable health information.
35
  In this context, 
                                                            
30 Brian D. Pacampara, Why Accretive Health Shares Skyrocketed, THE MOTLEY FOOL (July 31, 2012), 
http://www.fool.com/investing/general/2012/07/31/why-accretive-health-shares-
skyrocketed.aspx?source=itxsitmot0000001&lidx=6.  
31 Accretive Health, Inc. (AH), YAHOO! FINANCE, http://finance.yahoo.com/q?s=AH, (last visited Oct. 17, 2012).  
32 42 U.S.C.A. § 1320d-5(a)(3)(D).  
33 42 U.S.C.A. § 1320d-5(d)(2). 
34 45 C.F.R. § 160.102. 
35 45 C.F.R. § 160.103 (emphasis added).  
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“disclosure means the release, transfer, provision of, access to, or divulging in any other manner 
of information outside the entity holding the information.”36  Under the rule: 
A covered entity that accesses, maintains, retains, modifies, records, 
stores, destroys, or otherwise holds, uses, or discloses unsecured protected 
health information…in the case of a breach…[must] notify each individual 
whose unsecured protected health information has been or is reasonably 
believed by the covered entity to have been, accessed, acquired, or 
disclosure as a result of such breach.
37
 
 The Code of Federal Regulations defines a breach as “the acquisition, access, use, or 
disclosure of protected heath information…which compromises the security or privacy of the 
protected health information.”38  It is important to note that this includes actions like improper 
disposal of health records, where the data is not actually used or seen by a third party.  
Once a breach occurs, there are a number of requirements that the covered entity or 
business associate must comply with.  First, notifications must be made without unreasonable 
delay and in no later than 60 days after the discovery of the breach.
39
  Notification must be made 
to all affected individuals by first class mail and should be posted on the homepage of the 
entity’s web site if there are 10 or more individuals with insufficient contact information.40  If the 
breach affects 500 or more individuals within a state or jurisdiction, then notification must be 
made to prominent media outlets within the state; and notification must be made to the Secretary 
of the Department of Health and Human Services regardless of the size of the breach.
41
 
The notifications must include a description of the breach, a description of the unsecured 
health information that was breached, how individuals should protect themselves from potential 
                                                            
36 45 C.F.R. § 160.103.  
37 42 U.S.C. § 17932.  
38 45 C.F.R. §164.402.  
39 42 U.S.C. § 17932(d).  There is provision delaying notification if requested by law enforcement.  
40 42 U.S.C. § 17932(e).  
41 42 U.S.C. § 17932(e).  Notification to the Secretary need not be immediate breaches affecting less than 500.  
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harm, a description of how the entity will investigate the breach, mitigate losses, and protect 
from future breaches, and contact information for individuals to contact the entity.
42
 
III. THE VALUE OF HEALTH INFORMATION: HOW AND WHY THE DATA IS BREACHED  
 There are several factors that explain why the number of health data breaches has been 
remarkably high since the HITECH Act was passed in 2009.  The most apparent reasons include 
the shift of medical records to electronic form, the resistance shown by doctors and hospitals in 
converting their records, and the natural time it takes for federal regulations to be issued and for 
entities to come under compliance with those regulations. 
Initially, the push towards electronic health records was an objective of the George W. 
Bush administration.
43
  At the time less than 10 percent of physicians were using electronic 
records.
44
  The HITECH Act was passed in 2009 and included a “meaningful use” provision 
which gives government-backed incentives to doctors and eligible hospitals for converting their 
paper records and filing systems to electronic health records, among several other technology 
based objectives.
45
  In 2011, only 55 percent of physicians had taken the leap with resistance 
from older physicians and smaller practices.
46
  This shift to digitalization means that patients are 
becoming increasingly susceptible to medical data breach because it is now more accessible and 
more valuable. 
A. Causes of Health Data Breach  
                                                            
42 42 U.S.C. § 17932(f).  
43 Alvin Powell, U.S. Lagging in adoption of electronic health records, HARVARD UNIVERSITY GAZETTE (Oct. 12, 
2006), http://www.news.harvard.edu/gazette/2006/10.12/13-healthrecords.html; see also Nicolas P. Terry & Leslie 
P. Francis, Ensuring the Privacy and Confidentiality of Electronic Health Records, 2007 U. Ill. L. Rev. 681, 
681(2007). 
44 Id. 
45 See generally Nicholas P. Terry, Certification and Meaningful Use: Reframing Adoption of Electronic Health 
Records as a Qualitative Imperative, 8 Ind. Health L. Rev. 43 (2011).  
46 Jamoom, Eric et al, Physician Adoption of Electronic Health Record Systems: United States, 2011, NCHS Data 
Brief 98 (July 2012), http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/databriefs/db98.pdf.  
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As of November 2012, there have been over 500 reported cases of health data breaches 
affecting 500 or more and these breaches have affected over 21 million patients.
47
  Theft is now 
the most prevalent form of breach affecting covered entities and business associates, constituting 
over half of the breaches affecting 500 or more.
48
  This is logical since stealing thousands of 
electronic health records is far easier than stealing a filing cabinet full of patient folders, although 
nearly a quarter of these breaches involved paper records.
49
   
Paper records are far more susceptible to improper disposal, loss, and improper access, 
while electronic records stored on laptops, desktop computers, or portable electronic devices are 
generally the cause of breaches by theft.
50
  This harps on both the accessibility and the value of 
health data that is stored electronically.  The records are more accessible because more people 
have access to them, especially when the records are interoperable and accessed through 
networked hard drives.  For instance, stolen laptops, which can either house the data or access it, 
have been one of the major causes of data breaches and this generally results from simple 
carelessness.
51
   
The fact that it is likely that there will be more records in a concentrated place makes the 
records more valuable to identity thieves.  Identify theft can come in the form of either financial 
                                                            
47 BAs Involved in One of Nine New Reported Breaches, HIPAA & BREACH ENFORCEMENT STATISTICS FOR 
DECEMBER 2012,  http://www.melamedia.com/HIPAA.Stats.home.html (last visited Dec. 6, 2012).  
48 Keckley, Paul H. et al, Privacy and Security in Health Care: A fresh look, DELOITTE, available at 
http://www.deloitte.com/us/privacyandsecurityinhealthcare#.  [hereinafter Deloitte]. See also David Holtzman, 
Breach Notification for HIPAA Covered Entities and Business Associates at the NIST/OCR HIPAA Security 
Conference (June 7, 2012) available at http://csrc.nist.gov/news_events/hiipaa_june2012/day2/day2-
4_dholtzman_ocr-hitech-breach-notifcation-rule.pdf [hereinafter Holtzman Presentation]. 
49 Holtzman Presentation supra note 48. 
50 Breaches Affecting 500 or More Individuals, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES, 
http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/privacy/hipaa/administrative/breachnotificationrule/breachtool.html (last visited Dec. 6, 
2012).  
51 Deloitte supra note 48 at 2.  
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identity theft or medical theft, the dangers of which are both well documented.
52
  One’s medical 
identity can be used by others to receive medical treatment, potentially at the cost of the 
aggrieved party.
53
  While it is often the case that a stolen laptop will not result in identity theft 
because the purpose of theft was the hardware and not it’s content, there are a number of cases of 
data being stolen for the purpose of identity theft and this is why compliance with the Privacy 
and Security Rules is so imperative.  
B. Consequential Costs of a Health Data Breach to a Covered Entity  
 It is no secret that health data breaches can be extremely costly to the covered entity.  A 
2011 study on the costs of data breaches found that the cost per record lost in the healthcare 
industry was $240, making healthcare the fourth most costly among the industries examined.
54
  
Another study found that the average medical data breach resulted in over $2 million in related 
expenses.
55
  These costs did not include monetary penalties sanctioned by the government, which 
could reach as high as $1.5 million, or resulting lawsuits brought by the patients.
56
  
The consequential costs of a breach would include actions the covered entity must take in 
reacting to the breach such as: investigating the breach, mailing notices to patients, offering 
credit monitoring services to the patients, and hiring counsel.
57
  On top of these costs there are 
others that are not as easily calculated, like time and productivity loss, brand or reputation loss, 
                                                            
52 Second Annual Benchmark Study on Patient Privacy & Data Security, PONEMON INSTITUTE at 16 (Dec. 2011), 
http://www2.idexpertscorp.com/assets/uploads/PDFs/2011_Ponemon_ID_Experts_Study.pdf. [hereinafter Ponemon 
Study].  
53 Medical Identity Theft, WWW.IDENTITYTHEFT.INFO, http://www.identitytheft.info/medical.aspx (last visited Dec. 
6, 2012). 
54 2011 Cost of Data Breach Study, PONEMON INSTITUTE at 15 (Mar. 2012), 
http://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/about/media/pdfs/b-ponemon-2011-cost-of-data-breach-us.en-
us.pdf?om_ext_cid=biz_socmed_twitter_facebook_marketwire_linkedin_2012Mar_worldwide__CODB_US.  
55 Ponemon Study, supra note 52 at 1.  
56 The statutory authority on monetary fines is discussed infra, as is an analysis of pending class action suits brought 
under state privacy laws. 
57 Ponemon Study, supra note 52 at 1. 
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and loss of patient goodwill.
58
  At 4.2%, the healthcare industry has one of the highest “churn” 
rates, the percentage of patients who will no longer use the provider after a breach of personal 
information.
59
  Each of these patients is worth over $100,000 over the course of their lifetime, so 
a hypothetical breach affecting 1,000 patients could cost the entity $4.2 million in loss of patient 
goodwill alone.
60
  Taking this into account, in addition to the monetary fines, civil liability, and 
other related costs, a covered entity would likely lose several million dollars in dealing with a 
data breach.  Unfortunately, these costs, offset by the risk of suffering from a data breach, often 
do not constitute enough of an expense to encourage covered entities to improve their existing 
data security protocol.
61
  
IV. STEPS COVERED ENTITIES AND BUSINESS ASSOCIATES SHOULD TAKE TO COMPLY AND 
SAFEGUARD ELECTRONIC HEALTH DATA  
 As the use of electronic health records has risen, so too has the use of information 
technology consultants and internal HIPAA compliance officers.
62
  However, despite the 
availability of hundreds of information technology security firms, there are many basic steps that 
covered entities and business associates could take to meet statutory requirements, best deter the 
chance of data breach, and to alleviate the costs and damages post breach.  
A. Federal Regulations  
 The first step in properly protecting patient data is by meeting the baseline federal 
requirements on personal health information privacy.  The Department of Health and Human 
Services has the statutory authority to issue regulations and guidance on the interim Breach 
                                                            
58 Ponemon Study, supra note 52 at 1. 
59 2011 Cost of Data Breach Study, PONEMON INSTITUTE at 7 (Mar. 2012), 
http://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/about/media/pdfs/b-ponemon-2011-cost-of-data-breach-us.en-
us.pdf?om_ext_cid=biz_socmed_twitter_facebook_marketwire_linkedin_2012Mar_worldwide__CODB_US.  
60 Ponemon Study, supra note 52 at 2. 
61 Id. at 2.  
62 Bernie Monegain, High demand for Health IT consulting, HEALTHCARE IT NEWS (Oct. 2, 2012), 
http://www.healthcareitnews.com/news/high-demand-health-it-consulting.  
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Notification Rule under HITECH and under the HIPAA Privacy and Security Rules.
63
  The 
importance of complying with these regulations cannot be understated.  The general enforcement 
of these rules has been scarce, but upon a data breach of 500 or more the Office of Civil Rights 
will perform a review assessing the cause of the breach, compliance with the Privacy and 
Security Rules, and how the breach has been handled.
64
  HHS has discretion in issuing a 
monetary penalty based on the OCR report and is far more likely to do so when there is a lack of 
compliance because these constitute additional violations.
65
  
The regulations state that some rules are requirements, while others are merely 
addressable issues and their utilization should take into account factors such as the size of the 
covered entity, its technical infrastructure, the costs of the security measurements, and the 
probability of potential risks.
66
  Complying with these considerations should not call for a drastic 
overhaul of a covered entity’s existing protocol and exist to set minimum requirements that 
entities should hope to exceed.  Unfortunately, many covered entities fail to meet even these 
standards.
67
  
In 2011, the Office of Inspector General released the results of an audit of seven covered 
entities conducted between October 2008 and March 2010 and concluded that the Centers for 
Medicare & Medicaid Services were not sufficiently ensuring compliance by covered entities of 
the HIPAA Security Rule.
68
  The investigation uncovered 151 specific vulnerabilities (124 of 
which were deemed high impact) in the protection of electronic personal health information 
                                                            
63 42 U.S.C. § 17932(j); 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-2(264).  
64 Holtzman Presentation supra note 48.  
65 See generally Your Health and Your Privacy: Protecting Heath Information in a Digital World: Hearing Before 
the Subcomm. On Privacy, Technology, and the Law, 112th Cong. (2011), available at 
http://www.judiciary.senate.gov/hearings/hearing.cfm?id=9b6937d5e931a0b792d258d9b332c04d. 
66 45 C.F.R. § 164.306(b).  
67 Daniel R. Levinson, Nationwide Rollup Review of the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services Health 
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 Oversight, Office of Inspector General, May 2011 [hereinafter 
OIG Report].  
68 Id. at iii.  
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(ePHI) that left the covered entities susceptible to data breach.
69
  These vulnerabilities are helpful 
in examining the following federal regulations which are divided into administrative safeguards, 
physical safeguards, and technical safeguards.  
1. Administrative Safeguards 
The Administrative Safeguards listed within the Federal Regulations outline a number of 
general concerns that the corporate policies and procedures of covered entities should seek to 
comply with.  Specifically, rules should be in place in determining who may access and work 
with certain ePHI and who may enter the areas in which the information is stored.
70
  
Additionally, procedures should be developed to quickly verify whether ePHI has been accessed 
by an authorized or unauthorized workforce member, along with procedures for terminating 
access to the material when an employee is dismissed or leaves the position.
71
  
In order to properly implement these procedures it is essential that the entity’s security 
software is consistently updated to account for evolving threats and malicious software.
72
  The 
system should be sophisticated enough to produce audit trails for personal log-in attempts with 
automatic alerts for discrepancies.
73
  In this regard, the software should allow for the creation of 
user passwords, which need to be changed periodically.
74
  The passwords should be properly 
safeguarded in terms of data protection and in terms of employee disregard for their purpose.
75
 
The entity must create a contingency plan in case of emergencies, such as fire, vandalism, 
system failure, or natural disaster.
76
  The plan must call for the maintenance of backup exact 
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copies of ePHI and a means of recovering any lost data.
77
  The entity must also create a protocol 
for emergency mode operation, meaning they must be able to continue to perform critical 
business processes while dealing with the emergency.
78
  
2. Physical Safeguards  
The Federal Regulations define physical safeguards as “physical measures, policies, and 
procedures to protect a covered entity’s electronic information systems and related buildings and 
equipment, from natural and environmental hazards, and unauthorized intrusions.”79  The 
safeguards are mainly designed as a means of enforcing the administrative safeguards noted 
above.  For example, the administrative safeguards require entities to have policies as to whom 
may have access to areas where ePHI is stored and the physical safeguards require policies that 
limit physical access to these areas.
80
  This includes not only where the data is stored, but also 
restriction of physical access to workstations that may contain ePHI.
81
   
Another physical safeguard that entities must comply with is proper disposal of ePHI.
82
  
This requires the implementation of policies and procedures to remove and dispose of records 
from electronic media before it’s re-use.83  The regulations also recommend that entities maintain 
records of hardware and electronic media and those responsible for handling it and that entities 
create exact copies of ePHI before physical movement of the equipment.
84
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The dangers of failing to ensure proper destruction of ePHI was experienced by the 
Brighton and Sussex University Hospitals NHS Trust in April of 2010 in the United Kingdom.
85
  
The hospital had employed a contractor, Sussex Health Informatics Service, to destroy 
approximately 1,000 hard drives that were no longer in use.
86
  An employee of Sussex Health, 
who had access to the key code protected room holding the hard drives, removed at least 252 of 
the hard drives and sold at least 232 online.
87
  The hard drives, which had been used in the HIV 
and Genito Urinary Medicine Department, contained extremely personal data including: “names; 
date of birth; occupations; sexual preferences; STD test results and diagnoses for 67,642 patients 
in readable format.”88  This resulted in a monetary fine of £325,000 from the Information 
Commission’s Office under the Data Protection Act, taking account for the seriousness and 
highly sensitive nature of the data.
89
 
A similar situation occurred stateside in 2009, when unencrypted hard drives were stolen 
from a closed call-center facility.
90
  In that case, the call-center was leased by BlueCross 
BlueShield of Tennessee and the facility was not properly safeguarded upon closure.
91
  57 hard 
drives were stolen containing “member names, Social Security numbers, diagnoses codes, dates 
of birth and health plan identification numbers” and resulted in a $1.5 million fine.92 
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These cases illustrate some of the precautions entities should take in destroying ePHI and 
cleaning the electronic media on which it was stored.  Under HITECH, the third party 
responsible for removing and destroying the data in the Brighton and Sussex case would be 
governed as business associate.  Covered entities would want to ensure that there is a contract 
between the entity and the third party, expressly designating the third party as a business 
associate.
93
  As per the BlueCross BlueShield of Tennessee case, arrangements should have been 
made to destroy the data at the beginning of the foreclosure proceedings.   
The Department of Health and Human Services has specified the means to which health 
information should be destroyed.
94
  If the data is in the form of paper, film, or other hard copy 
media it must be “shredded or destroyed such that the PHI cannot be read or otherwise cannot be 
reconstructed.”95  Electronic media must be “cleared, purged, or destroyed” so that it cannot be 
retrieved and meet the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) requirements for 
Media Sanitation.
96
  Like the other Federal Regulations, these are small steps that the entities 
should have accounted for in order to avoid breach and the resulting penalties. 
3. Technical Safeguards  
 The technical safeguards of the Code of Federal Regulations address specific concerns 
about the operability of software.
97
  First, the software must assign unique identifiers to each user 
and track usage.
98
  The software must also allow for emergency access to the data as necessary.
99
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The Regulations recommend that the software have an automatic log-off function to terminate 
access after a predetermined period of time, that unauthorized alterations to ePHI be detected,  
and that the software use encryption and decryption techniques.
100
 
 Like the guidance on destruction of data, HHS has also issued guidance on data 
encryption.
101
  Meeting this standard is incredibly important because if the data is properly 
encrypted, it is rendered “unusable, unreadable, or indecipherable to unauthorized individuals” 
and is therefore not subject to the Breach Notification Rule.
102
  The Regulations define 
encryption as “the use of an algorithmic process to transform data into a form in which there is a 
low probability of assigning meaning without use of a confidential process or key.”103  To meet 
the HIPAA standard the confidential process or key that enables decryption must not have been 
breached.
104
  The encryption methods must meet NIST standards for data at rest and Federal 
Information Processing Standards (FIPS) for data in motion.
105
 
B. Other Compliance Measures to Reduce Data Breaches 
There are a number of other ways for a covered entity to safeguard itself from breaches of 
health data.  Some are more expensive than simply complying with the Federal Regulations 
above, but if properly implemented they could save a great deal of money in avoiding breach.  
Additionally, by taking these steps a covered entity would reduce the chance that HHS would 
levy fines against it in the event of a breach. 
First, the covered entity should choose HIPAA compliant software when converting to or 
updating EHR.  This should meet minimum encryption and password standards.  Next, covered 
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entities should limit the access to data via portable devices and keep data stored on central hard 
drives accessed over the cloud.  To help contrive and monitor the protocol, the covered entity 
should hire a compliance/security officer.  This officer should then give regular training to 
employees about the Privacy and Security Rules, as well as developing incident response plans 
and performing risk assessments.  
V. THE INADEQUACY OF THE CURRENT CIVIL MONETARY PENALTIES  
 The number of data breaches that have occurred since the passage of HITECH is terribly 
alarming and tends to support the notion that the current regulation of personal health 
information is inadequate in deterring future breaches, especially when the breaches are caused 
by such preventable and identifiable causes.  The most apparent issue is that the current 
monetary penalties are not significant enough to encourage a breaching entity to alter their 
standards and procedures and they are by no means strong enough to encourage other entities to 
do likewise.  The resistance of covered entities is also the result of a lack enforcement of the 
Privacy and Security Rules.  The probability of facing a monetary penalty following a breach is 
low so the potential costs to the entity are reduced by this likeliness.   
The current statutory framework of the Breach Notification Rule grants two separate 
causes of action to address health data breaches: one to the Secretary of the Department of 
Health and Human Services and one to the attorney general of the state in which the breach 
occurred.
106
  However, currently there is no federal private cause of action for aggrieved patients.   
A. Actions Brought by the Department of Health and Human Services 
  The penalties HHS may impose vary by degree of culpability (reasonable cause, willful 
neglect, unknowing) but all may reach a maximum of $50,000 for each violation, not to exceed 
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$1,500,000 for a single violation that occurs within a calendar year.
107
  Generally, these suits are 
not brought before a court and are settled between the parties.
108
  This allows for the parties to 
work together amicably in developing a resolution and avoid the time and money of going to 
court.   
1. Corrective Action Plans  
 The resolutions typically result in a Corrective Action Plan (CAP) that the entity must 
abide by by meeting specified security standards and issuing regular reports to the Office of Civil 
Rights.  A good example of the process involved the Massachusetts Eye and Ear Infirmary 
(MEEI), who settled with HHS in September 2012.
109
  Two years early, a neurologist of MEEI 
was traveling in South Korea and was the victim of a stolen laptop containing unencrypted 
information on over 3,500 patients.
110
  The doctor notified HHS and subsequently, OCR began 
its investigation of the breach and of the hospital’s security practices.111  Upon the investigation, 
OCR concluded that the hospital had failed to meet several elements of the Security Rule, 
Privacy Rule, and Breach Notification Rule.
112
  In reaching a Resolution Agreement, the parties 
agreed that $1,500,000 would be paid over three years and a Corrective Action Plan was 
developed to remedy the malfeasances and ensure future compliance.
113
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 The Resolution Agreement specified six areas of conduct that were in violation of HHS 
regulations.
114
  These areas were: (1) failure to perform an on-going risk analysis, (2) insufficient 
security measures to secure confidentially of ePHI, (3) lack of an incident response plan, (4) lack 
of policies restricting use of portable devices only to those authorized, (5) lack of policies 
tracking receipt and removal of portable devices, and (6) failure to encrypt data.
115
  These issues 
were taken into consideration in creating a three-year CAP requiring Annual Reports and 
document retention.
116
   
First, the CAP requires that MEEI develop policies and procedures to meet the Federal 
standards and submit the plan to HHS for approval.
117
  Second, the approved plan must be 
distributed to all members of MEEI’s workforce that have access to ePHI, who must then sign a 
compliance certificate before re-accessing ePHI.
118
  Next, MEEI must create additional 
procedures to investigate matters involving workforce members who fail to comply with the 
policies and procedures, along with providing required training.
119
  Lastly, MEEI must designate 
an independent compliance officer with expertise in compliance of the Security Rule to monitor 
the implementation of the plan, including performing unannounced audits, reviewing document 
retention, and preparing reports to HHS, among other duties.
120
  The Implementation Report and 
Annual Reports required to be submitted to HHS must include various certifications regarding 
the policies that have been implemented, copies of training materials, monitor findings, and a 
summary of any Reportable Events.
121
 
                                                            
114 Id. at 1-2.  
115 Id. 
116 Id. at A-2.  
117 Id. at A-3. The CAP includes a list of 10 factors that the plan must include into to gain approval. Id at A-4. 
118 Id. 
119 Id. at A-5.  
120 Id. at A-5-A-7.  
121 Id. at A-8-A-9.  
22 
 
The MEEI settlement is fairly representative of the enforcement taken by HHS upon a 
data breach by a covered entity or business associate.  The Resolution Agreement allows HHS 
and the entity to develop a CAP that is particularized to the concerns of the entity.  However, the 
requirements of the CAP are essentially nothing more than mandatory reporting.  The plan that 
MEEI was required to implement is a culmination of provisions listed within the Federal 
Regulations, meaning they are rules that MEEI should already have been complying with.   
2. Lack of deterrence 
Another point that the MEEI case illustrates is that the CAP and monetary penalty do not 
sufficiently act as deterrence against future breaches.  The breach discussed above was MEEI’s 
second data breach in less than six months.
122
  The first breach occurred in November 2009 when 
it was discovered that two employees were misappropriating patient credit cards.
123
  The case 
was reported to HHS under the Breach Notification Rule and no further action was taken against 
MEEI.
124
  After MEEI’s second breach, but before the Resolution Agreement with HHS was 
reached, MEEI suffered from a third breach of patient data.
125
  This breach, announced in April 
2012, also resulted from employee misconduct.
126
  In this instance the employee used patient 
names, Social Security Numbers, and dates of birth, possibly affecting as many as 3,600 
patients.
127
  MEEI subsequently gave one year of credit monitoring service to the patients, but 
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there was no action brought by HHS and the breach was not addressed in the Resolution 
Agreement released in September 2012.
128
   
This series of data breaches by a single entity emphasizes the lack of a deterrence 
function in the powers currently held by HHS.  Only one of MEEI’s three breaches was acted 
upon and each breach resulted from MEEI’s failure to meet HIPAA security regulations.  In 
applying this to other breaches, the odds of having a fine assessed against the covered entity is 
far less than one in three.  Since HITECH was passed only a handful of covered entities or 
business associates have been assessed a civil monetary penalty by HHS, while the number of 
breaches requiring patient notice has climbed to over 500.
129
  HHS has worked with the entities 
to correct their noncompliance with the Privacy and Security Rules and has developed CAPs in 
the absence of a fine.
130
   
Even so, the fines levied against the entity are generally insubstantial given the size of the 
entity and are unlikely to encourage other covered entities to adopt technical and procedural 
security measures.
131
  Under the current law, covered entities are likely to wait for a breach to 
occur and deal with the resulting investigation than to spend on measures that would prevent the 
breach.  
B. Actions Brought by State Attorney Generals  
As noted above, the statutory framework also gives a cause of action to state attorney 
generals acting as parens patriae for the residents of the state.
132
  The attorney general can seek 
damages of $100 per each adversely affected patient, but the total may not exceed $25,000 in a 
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single calendar year.
133
  Like HHS enforcement, this cause of action generally results in 
settlement rather than trial.
134
  Consequently, the attorney generals have more power than it 
would appear under the statute.  As discussed supra, the Accretive settlement resulted from 
several violations in addition to data breach, including state law collections practices and the 
entity was barred from conducting business in Minnesota for a period of six years and fined $2.5 
million.   
The first settlement reached under the HITECH Act also resulted in a fine over the 
statutory limit.
135
  The resolution was reached after a breach via a lost computer drive, affecting 
more than 500,000 Connecticut citizens.  The settlement of $250,000 included state law privacy 
protection violations, in addition to the HIPAA violations, and therefore could exceed the 
statutory damages cap.
136
  A Corrective Action Plan was also required by the settlement, which 
is not an expressly written remedy under HIPAA.
137
  As evidenced by these examples, the 
monetary penalties levied by state attorney generals, even when exceeding the statutory cap, is 
incapable of deterring future breaches by the breaching entity or other covered entities.  
There are several reasons that may explain why the current level of enforcement by HHS 
and state attorney generals has not kept pace with the number of significant health data breaches 
that have occurred since the passage of HITECH.  First, HHS may have allowed for leniency in 
penalizing breaching entities given the novelty of the amendment.  HHS has discretion when 
deciding whether to issue a fine and may take into consideration the size of the breach, the 
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amount of harm resulting from the breach, and how the entity responded to the breach.  
Additionally, the Breach Notification Rule, and parts of the Privacy and Security Rules, have not 
been finalized so it may be unreasonable to expect covered entities to spend on security when the 
measures they adopt may not be in compliance once a final rule is adopted.  
Second, there may have been an internal decision that the limited resources of HHS and 
OCR are better allocated battling other areas of concern.  For instance, HHS has recently 
implemented an overhauled auditing system to detect fraud in the Medicare and Medicaid 
context.
138
  There are many instances of breach where there is no resulting harm to the patients 
and no intentional wrongdoing by the covered entity, so it would be reasonable for HHS to be 
focusing its efforts on instances of intentional fraud.   
Lastly, state attorney generals may be ill-equipped to prosecute health data breach claims.  
An extensive, two-day training session was offered by HHS to interested state attorney generals 
in 2011, but the sophistication of the material could still have left the attorney generals feeling 
unprepared to bring a claim.
139
  Moreover, given the $25,000 statutory cap on damages, the 
attorney generals may have decided that federal enforcement of the Breach Notification Rule is 
more worthwhile, since state prosecutors also feel the effects of having limited resources and 
expectations from the public to prosecute egregious crimes.  
VI. THE SUCCESS OF PRIVATE CAUSES OF ACTION  
 While there is no federal private cause of action for individuals who have been the victim 
of a health data breach, there are some state law protections that offer an opportunity for redress.  
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Unfortunately, patients have had very little success on this endeavor, though a pending class 
action in the Eleventh Circuit may reverse this.  If successful, it could stand as a model upon 
which a federal private cause of action could be developed because the damages sought are far 
greater than statutory caps of the Breach Notification Rule.   
There are very few states that offer protection specifically for the breach of medical data, 
without other factors and many states preempt data disclosure statutes when they are governed 
by a federal body with similar regulations.
140
  However, like actions brought by state attorney 
generals, there may be underlying state law violations that that are actionable.  California 
currently has the most progressive medical breach statutes, which will be slightly restricted in 
2013.
141
  This statute and other pending lawsuits are addressed below.  
A. California Confidentiality of Medical Information Act  
 California’s Confidentiality of Medical Information Act (CMIA) governs the wrongful 
disclosure of personal health information.
142
  In this regard it is functionally similar to HIPAA, 
but the CMIA awards nominal damages of $1,000 to aggrieved plaintiffs without a showing of 
actual damages, and without a statutory maximum.
143
  This had led to a number of suits against 
health care providers, often for substantial sums of alleged damages.
144
  There is a general sense 
that this cause of action will not exist for much longer.
145
  The statute was enacted in 1981, prior 
to the digitalization of medical records, so data breaches involving a large number of plaintiffs 
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were unprecedented.
146
  Additionally, prior to breach notification laws patients would not have 
known about an improper disclosure of their health record unless they suffered a resulting harm.  
Now that plaintiffs must be notified, claims based on harmless data breaches have been filed and 
courts have been resistant to certify a class absent actual harm.  
 As of this writing, no cases have awarded damages for breach, but again, several class 
actions have been commenced, including one against IBM—as a business associate of Health 
Net—that is worth over a billion dollars under the statute.147  The Health Net case was removed 
to a Federal District Court and later dismissed for lack of standing insofar as the plaintiffs were 
asserting conjectured harm.
148
  The downfall of the plaintiffs was likely the removal to a federal 
court which applied a federal standing standard.   
Another breach occurred in September 2011 at the UCLA Health System.
149
  A hard 
drive was stolen from a physician’s home with information on 16,000 patients and a class action 
was filed in the Superior Court of Los Angeles in December 2011.
150
  On October 30, 2012, the 
plaintiff’s complaint was filed with the court with the CMIA being the only cause of action and 
seeking the award of nominal damages for all parties to be named in the case.
151
  This has the 
potential to result in damages of over $16 million, a substantial amount greater than the $1.5 
million permitted under HIPAA.
152
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 This case and others against Sutter Health for $4.25 billion,
153
 St. Joseph Health System 
for $31.8 million,
154
 and Stanford Hospital & Clinics for $20 million
155
 should sufficiently put 
health care providers on notice of the need to properly secure their data, even if the damages are 
not awarded.  Again, if these cases proceed they will result in far more damages than under 
HIPAA and will go towards the patients rather than HHS or the state.  This begs the question: 
which is the better deterrent against personal health information?  If an entity’s greatest concern 
in updating their privacy and security measures is cost, then the higher recoveries are surely a 
better means of encouraging upgrades in systems and policies and meeting the minimums of the 
federal regulations.  However, the size of the awards may be so detrimental to the entities that 
they would be less willing to shift to using ePHI to begin with.  
 The California legislature has taken the first steps in addressing the size of the class 
action suits by amending the current law to add an affirmative defense for the entity to take 
effect on January 1, 2013.
156
  The affirmative defense is very limited in its coverage in that the 
disclosure of confidential information must have been made to another covered entity or business 
associate and may not have been an incident of medical theft.
157
  In addition, the entity must 
have been complying with current best practices under HIPAA and properly responded to the 
breach.
158
  Moreover, the entity that received the confidential information must have destroyed 
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or returned the records and not retained, used, or released them.
159
  In effect, this amendment 
would do little to alter the current state of the pending class actions since several were the result 
of theft.
160
  It may not be until one of these cases is finalized that the legislature decides to act on 
this, or they feel that this is a good law and support it.   
B. Class Actions Under Non-medical State Disclosure Laws 
In addition to California’s private cause of action for the breach of medical data, private 
causes of action may exist for the disclosure of personal information in the non-medical context 
that would allow patients to recover for the breach of their ePHI.  Currently, there are pending 
cases surrounding three incidents of breach that may establish liability to health care providers.  
Previous cases have met resistance from the courts because the plaintiffs have failed to establish 
any actual harm.
161
  In Paul v. Providence Health Sys.-Oregon, the Oregon Supreme Court 
affirmed the dismissal of a class action suit resulting from the negligent loss of computer disks 
containing the records of 365,000 patients.
162
  The plaintiffs to the suit alleged negligence and 
sought the cost of credit monitoring services.
163
  In dismissing, the Court held that the credit 
monitoring is a cost against a possible future harm and is not actionable under the state’s Unfair 
Trade Practices Act absent a showing of actual harm.
164
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A comparable case in a Georgia state court may face a similar fate.
165
  In June 2012, a 
class action complaint was filed against Emory Healthcare Inc. in Fulton County Superior Court 
alleging violations of Georgia state laws.
166
  The case stems from a February 2012 theft of 
computer disks with the confidential information of over 315,000 patients, including names and 
Social Security Numbers.
167
  The complaint alleges causes of action for invasion of privacy, 
negligence, negligence per se, and breach of implied contract as tortious claims; and seeks 
nominal damages of $1,000 per class member and three years of credit monitoring, along with 
actual damages and exemplary damages.
168
  Without a statutory right to nominal damages, like 
the California statute, this class action is likely to fail for remoteness.
169
 
A trio of other class action suits have resulted from the theft of computer tapes stolen 
from the vehicle of an employee of Science Applications International Inc. (SAIC) in September 
2011, with the health information of 4.9 million patients.
170
  TRICARE is the health care 
provider of active duty, retired, and family members of military personnel.
171
  SAIC is a 
contractor of TRICARE and has been sued in California state court and a Texas District Court.
172
  
TRICARE and the United States Department of Defense have been sued in federal court in 
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Washington D.C.
173
  Of particular concern to the existence of actual harm and the possible 
calculation of damages is the fact that after the breach, TRICARE initially stated that they would 
not be providing credit monitoring services because they viewed the risk of financial harm as 
low.
174
  Later, TRICARE changed their stance on this decision and directed SAIC to provide 
credit monitoring.
175
 
The California suit has been filed on behalf any of the 4.9 million patients that currently 
live in California.
176
  The suit alleges three causes of action: violation of security requirements 
for consumer records under the Information Practices Act of 1977, common law negligence, and 
common law invasion of privacy.
177
  The plaintiffs seek actual damages, to be proven at trial, for 
“credit monitoring and insurance, out of pocket expenses, anxiety, emotional distress, loss of 
privacy, and other economic and non-economic harm.”178  It seems unlikely that this will be 
granted class certification because invasion of privacy may present a “common question of fact” 
issue that is particularized to each plaintiff.  Moreover, actual damages may be limited to credit 
monitoring services purchased before TRICARE directed SAIC to begin offering them, 
otherwise plaintiffs would have failed to mitigate their damages. 
As stated, SAIC has been sued in a Texas federal court as well, in a suit that is also still 
pending.
179
  This suit alleges that the class size includes all of the 4.9 million persons affected by 
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the breach.
180
  Unlike other medical data cases, the plaintiffs allege a violation of the Fair Credit 
Reporting Act, either willfully or negligently, stating that SAIC is a Consumer Reporting 
Agency under the statute.
181
  The Act has similar privacy requirements to HIPAA, and the 
plaintiffs claim that there was a duty to adopt protective procedures that would have thwarted the 
theft of the computer tapes and could result in actual damages between $100 and $1,000 per 
class member.
182
  On top of these claims the plaintiffs have also asserted causes of action for 
negligence, invasion of privacy, and violation of the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices-Consumer 
Protection Act.
183
  Like the class action in California, the plaintiffs may have trouble calculating 
actual damages that stemmed from the breach, especially after the credit monitoring services 
were offered.  
The last and most recently filed of this trio of actions was brought against TRICARE and 
the Department of Defense in the District Court in the District of Columbia, also representing all 
4.9 million consumers.
184
  This action includes sub-classes representing plaintiffs of 24 different 
states.
185
  The suit brought nine federal causes of action, including violations of the 
Administrative Procedures Act, Privacy Act of 1974, and Fair Credit Reporting Act, among 
others.
186
  The suit then brings a number of state-specific causes of action for the sub-classes.
187
   
While the three TRICARE cases may face dismissal for failure to state a claim upon 
which relief can be granted, an 11
th
 Circuit appellate ruling may have given victims of medical 
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data breach the greatest chance of recovery.
188
  In December 2009, two unencrypted laptops were 
stolen from the corporate offices of AvMed Inc. in Gainesville, Florida resulting in a breach of 
1.2 million health plan members.
189
  One of the distinguishing aspects of this case is that two of 
the plaintiffs were victims of actual identity theft in the year following the breach, as their 
information was used to open a bank account and a brokerage account that were then 
overdrawn.
190
  These plaintiffs were designated as a sub-class in the complaint.
191
   
A Florida district court had ruled that the plaintiffs failed to state a cognizable injury, but 
the 11
th
 Circuit Appellate Court overturned the dismissal allowing the case to go to trial.
192
  The 
court held that actual identity theft is an injury in fact, and that it was fairly traceable to the 
breach.
193
  The plaintiffs must still face class certification now that the case has been remanded; 
and if it reaches trial, it would be the first health data breach to do so in a federal court.
194
  It may 
hurt the class’s chances that only two plaintiffs have alleged actual identity theft, but the 
Appellate Court also overturned a motion to dismiss on a claim of unjust enrichment, holding 
that sufficient facts have been pleaded.
195
  The complaint states that the monthly premiums paid 
to AvMed constitute a benefit conferred and should be recoverable because part of that premium 
was to go to data security.
196
  Finding that the class has standing in a federal court may allow for 
the first trial over a medical data breach. 
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If any of these class action suits were to go to trial or result in a significant settlement 
against a covered entity there would be substantial ramifications to HHS’s enforcement of the 
Breach Notification Rule, the Privacy Rule, and the Security Rule.  This would take enforcement 
out of the hands of governmental regulating bodies and give it to the private sector.  A public 
policy concern that this may have is that monetary damages against covered entities will deter 
innovation in health information technology.  Outside of the “meaningful use” incentives, a 
practice could decide to rely solely on paper records and take the most basic steps in preventing 
breach.  On the other hand, a private cause of action could be very beneficial in deterring health 
data breaches.  Once a breach is disclosed, HIPAA violations could be uncovered on discovery 
and the costs of litigation and/or settlement would not be placed on the government, so a lack of 
resources would no longer be an excuse.  Of course, there would have to be some sort of 
limitations on these claims.  A federal cause of action, preempting state claims, would eliminate 
much of the current confusion.  Conversely, it would be unreasonable to expect a covered entity 
like TRICARE, who performs a public service, to payout $4.9 billion in damages following a 
breach.  While there may be no right answer as to the proper amount of a statutory cap on 
damages, it would need to be greater than the current limit under the Breach Notification Rule 
and prosecuted with more regularity and consistency, in order to properly deter breaches. 
VII. ADDITIONAL PROPOSALS TO QUELL DATA BREACHES 
While a private cause of action may be the most fiscally daunting means of deterring the 
number of health data breaches, there are additional regulations that could be considered to keep 
breaches from occurring.  Among these are amendments to the current Breach Notification Rule 
that would increase security regulations and an enhancement to the current HHS/OCR auditing 
system of covered entities.  
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A. Al Franken’s Protect Our Health Privacy Act 
Al Franken is the Senate representative for the state of Minnesota and the Chairman of 
the Subcommittee on Privacy, Technology, and Law.
197
  Franken has addressed the insufficiency 
of the current laws, and specifically the lack of enforcement by HHS.
198
  A panel discussion 
before the subcommittee partly attributed this to an inadequacy of regulations, most notably the 
delay in the issuing of a final HITECH rule.
199
  While the panel did not come to any definitive 
resolutions, Franken has introduced a bill to the Senate to amend the current rule, called the 
Protect Our Health Privacy Act.
200
   
The bill, which has been submitted to a committee for review, would require additional 
reports on complaints of health data breaches and how HHS and state attorney generals handle 
the complaints.
201
  The reports would detail the number of informal resolutions and instances of 
declined enforcement in relation to the number of settlements and fines.
202
  The purpose of this is 
to determine if HHS is enforcing the rule to the best of their ability and to see if there are areas in 
need of improvement.   
In addition, the bill would expressly include portable media under the encryption rule, 
requiring the data to be “unusable, unreadable, or indecipherable to unauthorized individuals.203  
This would be an attempt to reduce the number of breaches that result from lost or stolen laptops.  
Lastly, the bill would extend federal regulations governing covered entities to business 
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associates, as well as requiring that agreements between the two must limit the scope of use of 
the data to only that which is necessary for the performance of the function.
204
  Although the bill 
does not increase monetary penalties or regulation, it may at least put covered entities on notice 
of the regulations and be the stepping stone for the release of a final HITECH rule. 
B. Auditing 
A final means of ensuring compliance of the Security and Privacy Rules and reducing the 
number of health data breaches would be to increase the amount of auditing of covered entities 
and business associates.  HITECH provides HHS with a statutory grant to perform periodic 
audits.
205
  OCR has undertaken the duty of performing the audits and began a pilot program in 
November 2011.
206
  HHS proclaims the audits to be “comprehensive” in scope of the 
investigation, but OCR only audited 115 covered entities in the first year of the pilot program.
207
 
One potential way of increasing the number of and effectiveness of audits is to develop a 
covered entity-to-covered entity auditing program.  This could require health IT employees 
and/or administrators to travel to other covered entities and perform an audit based on HHS 
guidelines.  This audit could then be submitted to HHS, who could determine whether or not to 
further investigate covered entities after negative audits.  An entity based auditing system would 
increase the total number of covered entities that are inspected and require the entities to be in 
compliance with the mandatory federal regulations.  
 Another possible auditing system that would ensure that entities are being inspected 
properly would be to require accreditation from a third party auditor.  Covered entities could be 
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required meet a certain standard, such as the gold standard from The Joint Commission.
208
  This 
could then be tied to government kickbacks, like those related to “meaningful use.”  An auditing 
system like this is more likely to ensure compliance than the risk of facing monetary penalties 
following a breach of health data. 
CONCLUSION 
As HITECH “meaningful use” requirements push more health data records into ePHI, 
patients become more and more susceptible to data breach.  This issue has been recognized by 
the HHS and OCR, but not properly addressed or enforced.  The number of large-scale data 
breaches has grown to over 500 since the Breach Notification Rule was signed into law.  While 
the Rule takes the first step in making patients aware of potential privacy concerns, it has not 
done enough to stop the breaches from happening. 
In order to reduce the number of breaches, HHS must make known to covered entities 
and business associates that breaches will not be taken lightly, especially when there are 
additional privacy and security violations.  Plaintiffs have faced a substantial amount of 
resistance in bringing private claims under state laws and a federal, private cause of action under 
the Breach Notification Rule could resolve much of the current confusion.  Another way of 
reducing the number of breaches would be to increase enforcement of the Federal Regulations.  
Unfortunately, this is not a top priority for HHS, or may be beyond their means, and this could 
be addressed through the implementation of a more structured auditing system.  Entity-to-entity 
auditing or accreditation auditing systems would take much the enforcement costs from HHS and 
place it in the hands of the entities, while ensuring greater compliance.  While there may be no 
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guaranteed way reducing health data breaches, a mixture of these proposals would surely go to 
benefit patient privacy in the future.  
